

# **Exhibit 12**

S. HRG. 107-390

# THE GLOBAL REACH OF AL-QAEDA

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HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS  
AND TERRORISM  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS  
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(II)

## CONTENTS

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	Page
Caruso, Mr. J. T., Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC .....	3
Prepared statement .....	4
Flournoy, Ms. Michele, senior advisor, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC .....	20
Johnson, Mr. Larry C., former Deputy Director, (1989-1993) Office of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC .....	15
Prepared statement .....	17
Wilshere, Mr. Thomas, Deputy Section Chief, International Terrorism Operational Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC .....	7



## THE GLOBAL REACH OF AL-QAEDA

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2001

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL  
OPERATIONS AND TERRORISM,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer, (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Senators Boxer and Bill Nelson.

Senator BOXER. The hearing will come to order. Today, the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism meets to discuss the next steps in the global fight against the al-Qaeda terrorist organization. It has been just over 3 months since al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked U.S. civilian aircraft and used them as missiles to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a vicious and cruel act that killed and injured thousands of innocent people from more than 80 different nations.

While it was evident shortly after the September 11 attack that Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization were responsible, the administration's initial steps were of a diplomatic nature and quickly bore fruit. The United Nations Security Council passed a binding resolution requiring all member countries to pursue terrorists and the financial systems that support them.

NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, declaring that the September 11 attack on America was an attack on all 19 NATO nations. The Organization of American States followed suit by invoking the Rio Treaty, which obligates signators to consider an attack against any member as an attack against all, and more than 150 countries have joined the United States in targeting terrorist assets.

On October 7, the United States launched military strikes against al-Qaeda camps and Taliban military installations, and today I am happy to say the Taliban has been ousted from power. The Taliban is a regime that we in this committee have discussed over the years since 1997. We have always passed legislation, under both Republican and Democratic Presidents, that called on the Executive never to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Government of Afghanistan and both Democratic and Republican administrations followed the will of this committee. The American flag has been raised at the embassy in Kabul, and a new Afghan Government will shortly be sworn into power, and I am very pleased to say it will have two women in the interim government.

Al-Qaeda and their Taliban cohorts once controlled 95 percent of Afghanistan. Thanks to U.S. military action, al-Qaeda and Taliban control of Afghanistan is limited to just a number of caves. Despite the fact that Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are still at large, which is what we believe, the U.S. campaign against them has been extremely successful, and Americans should be very proud.

With bin Laden and his lieutenants on the run, I think it is important to look at the next steps in the campaign against al-Qaeda. At today's hearing, we will be examining the following:

No. 1. The impact of U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial actions, the impact of those actions on the al-Qaeda organization;

No. 2. The global reach and threat of al-Qaeda cells, including the possibility that al-Qaeda terrorists have obtained materials useful in creating weapons of mass destruction; and

No. 3. What can be done to build on the success of U.S. policies in fighting al-Qaeda terrorists and those that support them?

To help us accomplish these goals, I placed a call to Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff to ask that the Justice Department make available to this subcommittee a former member of al-Qaeda who testified for the government during the embassy bombing trials. We had a very long and interesting conversation, and it was agreeable. For a variety of reasons Mr. Chertoff suggested that the committee hear instead from members of the FBI who were very familiar with the testimony of these former members of al-Qaeda.

As a result, our witnesses on the first panel are Mr. J. T. Caruso, Acting Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, and Mr. Thomas Wilshire, Deputy Chief of the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section. Mr. Caruso will testify on al-Qaeda's global reach, al-Qaeda's ties to other terrorist organizations, and summarize what we learned about al-Qaeda from the embassy bombing trial.

Our second panel consists of two private witnesses, Mr. Larry Johnson, a former Deputy Director of the Office of Counterterrorism at the State Department, and Ms. Michele Flournoy, senior advisor of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Last week, the world saw a videotape in which Osama bin Laden admitted to being the cold, calculating murderer we all thought that he was. In the videotape, Osama bin Laden said, "when people see a strong horse and a weak horse by nature they will like the strong horse." Clearly, to me, we know who the strong horse is. It is the people of this country. It is the strength of this country. It is the convictions of this country. It is the democracy of this country. It is the military of this country. It is everything this country stands for.

And Mr. Caruso, I want to thank you very much for coming here today and making yourself available, because I do believe that we have lost our breath since September 11. Collectively as a country we did not know we had this enemy. We had no idea, in terms of the breadth and reach of this enemy. It came at us out of the blue, literally and figuratively, and you are going to help us today understand what this enemy looks like, how deep the roots are, and that will help us set policy that will ensure our success, so we welcome

you very much. We do not have any time limits. Please present what you have to say.

**STATEMENT OF MR. J. T. CARUSO, COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. CARUSO. Good afternoon, Madam Chairman. I am pleased to appear before the subcommittee to discuss al-Qaeda. I have a longer statement, which I have submitted to be included in the record, but what I would like to do is just touch upon some highlights, and we will move on to the discussion.

Senator BOXER. Please, take your time.

Mr. CARUSO. Al-Qaeda, roughly translated, "The Base," was developed by Osama bin Laden and others in the early 1980's to support the war effort in Afghanistan against the former Soviet Union. The resulting victory in Afghanistan gave rise to the overall jihad, or Holy War.

Senator BOXER. Would you pull the mike closer to you so everyone can hear.

Mr. CARUSO. Trained Mujahedin fighters from Afghanistan began returning to such countries as Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia with extensive jihad experience and the desire to continue the jihad. One of the principal goals of al-Qaeda was to drive the U.S. Armed Forces out of Saudi Arabia and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian Peninsula, as well as out of Somalia. Although al-Qaeda functions independently of other terrorist organizations, it also uses other terrorist organizations to accomplish its goals.

Osama bin Laden justifies the criminal action of al-Qaeda through the issuance of fatwahs, which are nothing more than his own warped interpretation of Islamic law. Al-Qaeda's fatwahs essentially indicate that attacks against U.S. interests, domestic and foreign, civil and military, are both proper and necessary.

For example, on February 22, 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwah stating that it is the duty of all Muslims to kill Americans. This fatwah read in part, "in compliance with God's order we issue the following fatwah to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies, including civilians and military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."

Senator BOXER. Would you repeat that fatwah, the whole thing, from the top?

Mr. CARUSO. It is an excerpt from a February 22, 1998 fatwah. In it, bin Laden states it is the duty of all Muslims to kill Americans. This fatwah read in part, "in compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwah to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies, including civilians and military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."

Those fatwahs have resulted in attacks against U.S. nationals in locations around the world, including Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and now in the United States. Since 1993, thousands of people have died in those attacks. As was revealed at the trial that took place in New York earlier this year, bin Laden and al-Qaeda



were seeking to obtain nuclear and chemical weapons, and the organization engaged in sophisticated training.

The persons who carried out the 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania have since been publicly identified. The principal participants were members of al-Qaeda and/or the affiliated terrorist group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. In short the testimony in the trial confirmed that al-Qaeda has access to the money, training, and equipment it needs to carry out successful terrorist attacks. They plan their operations well in advance, and have the patience to wait to conduct the attack at the right time.

In conclusion, let me state that it is too early to tell from a law enforcement perspective how the current military campaign in Afghanistan will affect al-Qaeda and its ability to operate in the future. Determination and vigilance will remain the keys to any success. It is one thing to disrupt an organization such as al-Qaeda. It is another to dismantle and destroy it. This must truly remain an international effort, and all agencies within the U.S. Government must remain vigilant and must continue to work together in order to eradicate this scourge to all mankind everywhere known as al-Qaeda.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Caruso follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. T. CARUSO, ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,  
COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Good morning, Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee. My name is J. T. Caruso and I am the Acting Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss Al-Qaeda International.

AL-QAEDA INTERNATIONAL

"Al-Qaeda" ("The Base") was developed by Osama Bin Laden and others in the early 1980's to support the war effort in Afghanistan against the Soviets. The resulting "victory" in Afghanistan gave rise to the overall "Thad" (Holy War) movement. Trained Mujahedin fighters from Afghanistan began returning to such countries as Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, with extensive "jihad" experience and the desire to continue the "jihad". This antagonism began to be refocused against the U.S. and its allies.

Sometime in 1989, Al-Qaeda dedicated itself to further opposing non-Islamic governments in this region with force and violence. The group grew out of the "mekhtab al khidemat" (the Services Office) organization which maintained offices in various parts of the world, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States. Al-Qaeda began to provide training camps and guesthouses in various areas for the use of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups. They attempted to recruit U.S. citizens to travel throughout the Western world to deliver messages and engage in financial transactions for the benefit of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups and to help carry out operations. By 1990 Al-Qaeda was providing military and intelligence training in various areas including Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Sudan, for the use of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups, including the Al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad) organization.

One of the principal goals of Al-Qaeda was to drive the United States armed forces out of Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) and Somalia by violence. Members of Al-Qaeda issued *fatwahs* (rulings on Islamic law) indicating that such attacks were both proper and necessary.

Al-Qaeda opposed the United States for several reasons. First, the United States was regarded as an "infidel" because it was not governed in a manner consistent with the group's extremist interpretation of Islam. Second, the United States was viewed as providing essential support for other "infidel" governments and institutions, particularly the governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the nation of Israel and the United Nations organization, which were regarded as enemies of the group. Third, Al-Qaeda opposed the involvement of the United States armed forces in the Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993,

which were viewed by Al-Qaeda as pretextual preparations for an American occupation of Islamic countries. In particular, Al-Qaeda opposed the continued presence of American military forces in Saudi Arabia (and elsewhere on the Saudi Arabian peninsula) following the Gulf War. Fourth, Al-Qaeda opposed the United States Government because of the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of persons belonging to Al-Qaeda or its affiliated terrorist groups or with whom it worked, including Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, who was convicted in the first World Trade Center bombing.

From its inception until approximately 1991, the group was headquartered in Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan. Then in 1991, the group relocated to the Sudan where it was headquartered until approximately 1996, when Bin Laden, Mohammed Atef and other members of Al-Qaeda returned to Afghanistan. During the years Al-Qaeda was headquartered in Sudan the network continued to maintain offices in various parts of the world and established businesses which were operated to provide income and cover to Al-Qaeda operatives.

#### AL-QAEDA TIES TO OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Although Al-Qaeda functions independently of other terrorist organizations, it also functions through some of the terrorist organizations that operate under its umbrella or with its support, including: the Al-Jihad, the Al-Gamma Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group—led by Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and later by Ahmed Refai Taha, a/k/a “Abu Yasser al Masri,”), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a number of jihad groups in other countries, including the Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, the Kashmiri region of India, and the Chechen region of Russia. Al-Qaeda also maintained cells and personnel in a number of countries to facilitate its activities, including in Kenya, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. By banding together, Al-Qaeda proposed to work together against the perceived common enemies in the West—particularly the United States which Al-Qaeda regards as an “infidel” state which provides essential support for other “infidel” governments. Al-Qaeda responded to the presence of United States armed forces in the Gulf and the arrest, conviction and imprisonment in the United States of persons belonging to Al-Qaeda by issuing fatwahs indicating that attacks against U.S. interests, domestic and foreign, civilian and military, were both proper and necessary. Those fatwahs resulted in attacks against U.S. nationals in locations around the world including Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Yemen, and now in the United States. Since 1993, thousands of people have died in those attacks.

#### THE FATWAH’S OF AL-QAEDA

##### *The Fatwah Against American Troops in Somalia*

At various times from about 1992 until about 1993, Osama Bin Laden, working together with members of the fatwah committee of Al-Qaeda, disseminated fatwas to other members and associates of Al-Qaeda which directed that the United States forces stationed in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, should be attacked. Indeed, Bin Laden has claimed responsibility for the deaths of 18 U.S. servicemen killed in “Operation Restore Hope” in Somalia in 1994.

##### *February, 1998 Fatwah*

On February 22, 1998, Bin Laden issued a fatwah stating that it is the duty of all Muslims to kill Americans. This fatwah read, in part, that “in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwah to all Muslims: the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies, including civilians and military, is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.” This fatwah appears to have provided the religious justification for, and marked the start of logistical planning for, the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

In February 1998, Osama Bin Ladin and one of his top lieutenants and leader of the Al-Jihad organization in Egypt, Ayman Al Zawahiri, endorsed a fatwah under the banner of the “International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and Crusaders.” This fatwah, published in the publication *Al-Quds al-Arabi* on February 23, 1998, stated that Muslims should kill Americans—including civilians—anywhere in the world where they can be found. In or about April 1998, one of the defendants in the East Africa trial, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, discussed the fatwahs issued by Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda against America with another defendant, Mustafa Mohamed Fadhil. This discussion took place in Kenya.

## THE TRIAL IN NEW YORK CITY

As was revealed at the trial that took place in New York earlier this year, a former member of Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network began working with the United States government in 1996. That witness revealed that Bin Laden had a terrorist group, Al-Qaeda, which had privately declared war on America and was operating both on its own and as an umbrella for other terrorist groups. The witness revealed that Al-Qaeda had a close working relationship with the aforementioned Egyptian terrorist group known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The witness recounted that Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were seeking to obtain nuclear and chemical weapons and that the organization engaged in sophisticated training. He also revealed that Al-Qaeda obtained specialized terrorist training from and worked with Iranian government officials and the terrorist group Hezbollah. Thereafter, in August 1996, two years prior to the bombings of the embassies in East Africa, Osama Bin Laden issued a public Declaration of Jihad against the United States military. This was followed by a series of other statements including a February 1998 joint declaration, signed by Osama Bin Laden and the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), among others, which declared war on the American population, military and civilian. The public statements corroborated the witness information that Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and EIJ were working to kill Americans. In May 1998, Bin Laden gave a press interview in which he threatened American interests and complained that the United States was using its embassies overseas to track down terrorists.

On August 7, 1998, the bombings of the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, occurred roughly simultaneously. The persons who carried out the attacks in Kenya and Tanzania have since been identified publicly: the principal participants were members of Al-Qaeda and/or the affiliated terrorist group EIJ. Indeed, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, a Saudi who admitted he was in the bomb truck used in Nairobi, confessed that he had been trained in Al-Qaeda camps, fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan (with the permission of Osama Bin Laden), had asked Bin Laden for a mission and was thereafter dispatched by others to East Africa after undergoing extensive specialized training at camps in Afghanistan. Another defendant, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, in whose residence was found a sketch of the area where the bomb was to be placed, admitted he was a member of Al-Qaeda and identified the other principal participants in the bombing as Al-Qaeda members. Odeh admitted that he was told the night prior to the bombings that Bin Laden and the others he was working with in Afghanistan had relocated from their camps because they expected the American military to retaliate.

There was independent proof of the involvement of Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and EIJ in the bombings. First, the would-be suicide bomber, al-Owhali, ran away from the bomb truck at the last minute and survived. However, he had no money or passport or plan by which to escape Kenya. Days later, he called a telephone number in Yemen and thus arranged to have money transferred to him in Kenya. That same telephone number in Yemen was contacted by Osama Bin Laden's satellite phone on the same days that al-Owhali was arranging to get money. Moreover, al-Owhali and Odeh both implicated men named "Harun," "Saleh" and "Abdel Rahman," now all fugitives, as organizing the Nairobi bombing. All three have been conclusively shown to be Al-Qaeda and/or EIJ members. Indeed, documents recovered in a 1997 search of a house in Kenya showed Harun to be an Al-Qaeda member in Kenya. The house where the Nairobi bomb was assembled was located and proved to have been rented by that same Al-Qaeda member Harun. Moreover, the records for the telephone located at the bomb factory showed calls to the same number in Yemen which al-Owhali contacted for money after the bombing and which Osama Bin Laden's satellite telephone also contacted before and after the bombings.

The person arrested for the Tanzania bombing, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, also implicated "Saleh" and "Abdel Rahman" in the Tanzania bombing—as did Odeh. Telephone records confirmed that the Kenya and Tanzania cells were in contact shortly before the bombings.

Additional proof of the involvement of Al-Qaeda and EIJ in the East Africa bombings came from a search conducted in London of several residences and business addresses belonging to Al-Qaeda and EIJ members. In those searches, a number of documents were found, including claims of responsibility in the name of a fictitious group. Al-Owhali, the would-be suicide bomber, admitted that he was told to make a videotape of himself using the name of a fictitious group, the same name found on the claims of responsibility. The claims of responsibility were received in London on the morning the bombings occurred, likely before the bombings even occurred. The claim documents could be traced back to a telephone number that was in contact with Bin Laden's satellite telephone. The claims, which were then disseminated to the press, were clearly authored by someone genuinely familiar with the bombing

conspirators as they stated that the bombings were carried out by two Saudis in Kenya and one Egyptian in Tanzania. The nationality of the bombers did not become known to investigators until weeks later. Moreover, the plan had been for two Saudis to be killed in the Nairobi bombing but only one was actually killed as al-'Owhali ran away at the last minute. Thus the claims were written by someone who knew what the plan was but before they knew the actual results.

In short, the trial record left little doubt that the East Africa embassy bombings were carried out as a joint operation of Al-Qaeda and EIJ. The testimony in the trial confirmed that:

- Al-Qaeda has access to the money, training, and equipment it needs to carry out successful terrorist attacks.
- They plan their operations well in advance and have the patience to wait to conduct the attack at the right time.
- Prior to carrying out the operation, Al-Qaeda conducts surveillance of the target, sometimes on multiple occasions, often using nationals of the target they are surveilling to enter the location without suspicion. The results of the surveillance are forwarded to Al-Qaeda HQ as elaborate "ops plans" or "targeting packages" prepared using photographs, CAD/CAM (computer assisted design/computer assisted mapping) software, and the operative's notes.

#### HOW U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS MIGHT AFFECT AL-QAEDA

It is too early to tell, from a law enforcement perspective, how the current military campaign in Afghanistan will affect Al-Qaeda and its ability to operate in the future. Determination and vigilance will remain the keys to any success. It is one thing to disrupt an organization such as Al-Qaeda, it is another to totally dismantle and destroy it. This must truly remain an international effort, with international cooperation on all levels, in order to be successful. All agencies within the U.S. government must remain vigilant, and must continue to cooperate and work together, in order to truly eradicate this scourge to all mankind everywhere known as Al-Qaeda.

Senator BOXER. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wilshere, do you want to add anything? We would love to hear from you if you have something to add.

#### **STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS WILSHERE, DEPUTY SECTION CHIEF, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OPERATIONAL SECTION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. WILSHERE. I would be happy to answer questions.

Perhaps if I could just do an overview, in fact, all the way back to the beginning, if you view the worldwide jihad movement, that much of it is considered to be legitimate by many of our allies in terms of defense of Islam. It is a multi, maybe even a multibillion effort that manifests itself in places like Chechnya or Bosnia, the Philippines, and it has been going on for a long time and it involves a great logistics effort as well.

If you view that as a large river with a number of tributaries, many of which are somehow legitimate, or illegitimate, including humanitarian aid, al-Qaeda is one of the most significant off-shoots. There are several others, and one could look at the last 10 years as a process by which those off-shoots converged and began to assist each other more regularly and with greater effect.

The goals of the group, I think it was evident during some of the testimony during the bombing trials, and certainly came out during the course of the FBI's investigations over the years, as well as that of other agencies and countries, have evolved, as well as their capabilities from one that insisted on the United States leaving bin Laden's Holy Land, which would be Mecca and Medina and the surrounding area, to one in which the United States is viewed as

the stabilizing mechanism that allows the regimes that bin Laden views to be corrupt to stay in power.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be two examples of that, and so as Mr. Caruso noted, one of bin Laden's key allies is the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and their goal started off as an attack on the Egyptian Government.

As long ago as the February 1998 fatwah the views evolved to incorporate the Arab-Israeli conflict which had not been too much on bin Laden's screen before that, at least visibly. That has become more solidly part of the effort, and the effect of that has been to draw more diverse support into bin Laden's fold. It would appear that one of the other objectives that bin Laden certainly achieved, although I do not think he perhaps anticipated it taking quite this form, was to so provoke the West that it would engage in a land war in Afghanistan, thereby provoking Armageddon between the West and the Muslim world.

That latter effect has not happened, which is a good thing, but that could be said to be one of his objectives in terms of degrees of arrogance and self-belief. He overreached, it would appear.

The other parts, your comment right at the very end of your opening remarks, struck a chord as well, on contrasting strengths, and one of the key things that drove bin Laden over the years was the American withdrawal from Lebanon and Somalia, and he cites this repeatedly in his public statements. In fact, when 18 soldiers were killed in Somalia, the Americans left, and that to him was a lesson that he took, that Americans prize people, Russians prize machines, and between the two of them, that was kind of the approach that the extremists took against each target.

With that, I will stop.

Senator BOXER. I have so many questions, and since I do not have any colleagues here, I can ask them all.

You had the benefit, the FBI did, of a couple of defections. Without naming any names—some of them are in the public record, because they testified in court—what do you take away from these people in terms of how deep does the loyalty run to bin Laden, for example? We know that a lot of folks would work for bin Laden because they are mercenaries, and he is going to pay them. He is going to give them pay, going to give them health benefits, if you will, and my understanding is some people were upset that he did not come through on his promise. So in other words, how much of bin Laden's power, if you will, is a real belief in what he stands for, his fatwahs, and how much of it is, it is a job and we are going to go do this?

Mr. CARUSO. Mr. Wilshere and I will probably take and split answers to questions to give you as satisfying a response as we can.

I think you are going to find individuals who run the gamut with reference to commitment, and I think that bin Laden certainly symbolizes a cause which brings individuals who are impoverished and who want to be aligned with something larger, and something they perceive to be good and be involved in a cause, and so I think you have some individuals who are very much committed to the cause, and he is the best symbol in their eyes at this time.

I think from that core group you have concentric circles of individuals who have varying allegiances, varying intensities in their

allegiance to the cause and to him, and then it goes all the way out to individuals who are venture seekers and the like. That would be kind of the breadth that I would say.

Mr. WILSHERE. In particular, from the former members who we have talked to, there is—again you also have several generations, because, for example, the Africa bombers were people who came out of the Afghanistan jihad era and then the Somali fight, whereas the others have come up since then and they are younger, but bin Laden first, if you look at him as one among several principalities among the Arab jihadists in Afghanistan and Chechnya, there was an active assessment process and a recruitment process, a collaboration and a swapping of resources that went on.

In the course of this, potential candidates for al-Qaeda were sized up and assessed, and at least in the earlier version of the al-Qaeda pre-Africa bombings there are very special qualities that went with somebody who became a formal member who swore allegiance. It is called, giving bayat, who swore allegiance to bin Laden.

Senator BOXER. What does giving bayat mean?

Mr. WILSHERE. It means swearing allegiance, a particular kind of oath, but essentially the qualities were, commitment to Islamic scholarship—they needed to be able to recite a large portion of the Koran from memory—the ability to play nicely with others, because one of bin Laden's key contributions to the jihadist effort, and one of the reasons why this will continue to be an ongoing issue for us for sometime to come, I believe, is the ecumenical approach.

It does not matter if you are a Lebanese or a Palestinian or an Egyptian or an Iraqi, if you believe in the cause, that is the prerequisite, and a third would be staying power, the ability to continue to grow and to develop. Again, you have enlisted folk and you have officers, and there are different levels of talent and commitment within.

Senator BOXER. If you were to give me—and I know this is not a science. Clearly, we are trying to do the best from all of the intelligence that we have, from the defectors, from your experience—and I am going to ask the next panel this as well—the American people are trying to wrap their arms around this enemy, if you will. What are we talking about in terms of size, and out of that, would we say the top echelon is just a very small group? I mean, how many people are we talking about worldwide here, and how many of those do we think are at the top level?

I understand this is a guesstimate on this part. Just give it your best shot.

Mr. WILSHERE. If I could just characterize a little bit of type first, and then I will take a shot at the numbers. First of all, you have the al-Qaeda hard core that brought us the USS *Cole* bombing, the Africa bombing, the World Trade Center, very particular type of operation, much smaller elite, probably in the hundreds perhaps in terms of terrorist capabilities probably in the hundreds, but also a lot of the al-Qaeda hard core was committed to supporting the Taliban militarily against the Northern Alliance, supporting the jihads in Chechnya in particular, so you are talking in the thousands, probably, small thousands.

Beyond that you have groups that are less talented, perhaps, or their skill level is not yet as high, but who certainly have bad in-

tent in improving capabilities, because they have been cycled through graduate schools, the equivalent of graduate schools in the camps. Those number in the thousands, and they are dispersed throughout the world.

Senator BOXER. You say thousands. Are we talking tens of thousands, or are we talking 20,000? I have heard 26,000 as a number.

Mr. WILSHERE. I would say in terms of a terrorist threat that is probably too high, in terms of the actual terrorist part of it. In terms of a supporting community, or in terms of the ability to launch, for example, paramilitary or insurgency situation in Indonesia, the Philippines, or Malaysia, or certainly Tajikistan or the former Soviet Union, you are talking in the thousands, but I would not regard all those as terrorists, either.

So in terms of terrorist capability there is a sympathetic support group that probably numbers in the thousands, an actual terrorist-capable element that numbers in the hundreds, but that might be low, but that is what I would say.

Senator BOXER. Well, that is very helpful to us, because that is what I am trying to put my arms around here, what we are dealing with.

Would you agree with that, Mr. Caruso?

Mr. CARUSO. Yes, I would.

Senator BOXER. Now, knowing what you know, again from the people who have talked to you and have come over to our side, and I do not know if you have asked this question to these people, but the bin Laden tape—and I am trying to put myself in the place of someone who was loyal to him, and then you see him laughing, because the people who were on the planes supposedly did not really know exactly what their mission was, and he finds it amusing. Is there—and I was really glad the administration chose to let that tape out. I mean, I think it was very important.

Can you make an assessment, just based upon your intelligence—I mean, your natural intelligence, as well as information you have, as to how that would play with some of these people who appear to be educated at the upper level? We know some of them are going to say it was doctored, but most people looking at that would never say that, it seems to me, so what is your sense of how that tape would play with those people who are loyal to him up to this point? Do you think it would sway them in any way?

Mr. WILSHERE. I would probably look at and interpret the tape in a slightly different way, I think, in the sense that people who are committed to a cause, particularly if they have gone through the training to become suicide operatives, they do not necessarily know when they are going to be tapped on their shoulder, but they commit to going once they are tapped.

In terms of operational security, there would be a difference between telling them what their specific mission was and tapping them on the shoulder to say now is your time, go over there, this is it, but we are not going to tell you exactly what you are going to do until the last minute, so in terms of that, I would see that perhaps as differently than as a betrayal of them, and I suspect that those who are sympathetic to bin Laden would see it in the same light.

Senator BOXER. Well, why would he laugh about it, if that was par for the course?

Mr. WILSHERE. He was not laughing in terms of playing a trick on them so much as it was preserving operational security, saying no, we would not tell them until the last minute to preserve operational security. It could very well have been that it was an uncalculated laugh that, had he known it was going to be preserved for posterity, he would not have made, you are right, but in terms of—

Senator BOXER. That is when you learn the truth about people, right, when they are off-guard.

What do you think, Mr. Caruso?

Mr. CARUSO. You asked about the natural thinking about this. There is no one that is so blind as they that would not see, and individuals who are aligned with him see victory, and do not see the kind of detail that you and I see and that we find shocking to our conscience.

Senator BOXER. So would you say he is a very charismatic leader?

Mr. CARUSO. He certainly has focused me and energized me.

Senator BOXER. And he has energized all Americans. I am talking about his followers. Would you say that he is a charismatic leader, that he has a loyal following, whatever the size of it is?

Mr. CARUSO. I believe that he does.

Mr. WILSHERE. His followers who have talked to us say he is extraordinarily charismatic. He is the type of person who is perceived to be humble. He gets down in the dirt with the troops. He clearly puts himself in the line of fire. I am told, and I do not know myself, but I am told that he has extraordinarily beautiful Arabic, and an idea that just shines for them, so yes, he is very charismatic.

Senator BOXER. OK, having said that now, he is an extremely charismatic leader, what happens when we get him, to his followers, if he is the charismatic leader that you say he is. When we get him, what happens to the organization? Does it continue? Does a new leader come up? Because it takes me back to the old days of World War II, when there was a big dispute about what would happen if Hitler were killed and half the people said, oh, it would get worse, because his followers—and the other half said, get rid of him, everything will fall apart, people are more afraid than they are loyal to him, and we know what history shows.

What do you think happens when you get him?

Mr. CARUSO. Different people have different opinions. This is one opinion.

Senator BOXER. This is all about what you think. This is not something that we are saying is gospel, because no one knows. I am just trying to get a picture of what you think from what you know.

Mr. CARUSO. I think to disrupt and dismantle the organization we need to go beyond just one leader and dig down into middle management, or at least upper middle management. That kind of decapitation works.

Having said that, however, there is a natural momentum in organizations, and although we may reduce the horrific consequences by 30 percent, we still have the 70 percent to deal with, and I go



back to the original, my opening statement and what FBI Director Mueller has said and Attorney General Ashcroft has said, that we need to keep the pressure on worldwide and just continue this fight to really dismantle and disorganize.

Senator BOXER. So you do not see it falling apart when we get him?

Mr. CARUSO. I see that there is going to be a stuttering in the organization's momentum. The question is, will that stutter turn into a pause? I do not know, but there will be a residual momentum in the organization that, if we reduce the effort, if we reduce the horrific consequences by 30 or 40 percent, meaning they do 40 percent less, we still have to deal with the 50 or 60 percent that it might represent.

Senator BOXER. Well, let me follow that through and get into the terrorists' mind here who work for him, the group that is really pretty much on the top. They have seen the response of America. I mean, this has been an all-out military response, spare nothing.

Now, you are sitting there, you see this, you see these bombs falling, you see what happens, and now bin Laden is, let us say, killed. You continue this, is that what you are saying? You would continue this, knowing that—is your point that we need to stick with it so that it can never rear its head again? I think that is what you are basically saying, that we cannot just say we have done this, we have stopped it, but we need to continue on.

That is one of the purposes of this hearing, to look ahead, and the President has certainly said this, and many of us have said this as well, that we cannot risk the fact that this could go away. We have got to just keep on tracking it wherever it appears. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. CARUSO. I do not believe that we will experience what we experienced in 1945, with the V-E Day [Victory in Europe], or V-J Day [Victory in Japan]. I think that it is, as the President has laid out, a strategy that we must continue on, but it is more than just certainly a military approach. It is all the tools in the toolbox that the President has actually put in place, as just briefly in the diplomatic area, the kind of coalition-building that the Secretary of State has been able to produce, in the stunning military achievements that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Director of Central Intelligence Tenet within the intelligence services, our own Director Mueller in law enforcement, individual countries who are not on the front line in Afghanistan are in the front line of their own nations, and just now Attorney General Ashcroft has come back from a visit to Europe with key partners there.

So it is a multiple-level law enforcement as well as the military-economic, and the law enforcement breaks out into subtools, if you will, financial investigations and the kind of vigorous financial effort that is going on there, and disruption.

Senator BOXER. So you agree, regardless of bin Laden's fate, that we need to continue on and continue on until we have truly stopped this everywhere in the world. That is basically what you are saying. You do not think this goes away if he is gone.

Mr. CARUSO. Yes. I would ask my colleague, Mr. Wilshere, to speak to that.

Mr. WILSHERE. I would agree completely with Mr. Caruso that perhaps—I do not know, perhaps 5 years ago had bin Laden left the picture, things might have evolved differently, but in my view what has happened is, the capabilities and reach of the organization have reached critical mass. They had a long head start they built, so the campaign against the safe haven in Afghanistan is to my mind as important, if not more important than the search for bin Laden and his top two leaders, because of the capability that those safe havens represented.

I have seen an estimate that somewhere between 70 and 80 dozen people have moved through the training camps there, and out to who knows where. The large majority of those people have probably had their late teen adventure and will go on to become normal citizens, but for that group that decides they want to pick this up as a way of life, that is a serious, serious worldwide threat, as has been demonstrated, so yes, I would agree that it is a really important campaign.

Senator BOXER. That leads me to my last question for this panel, and then we will bring up the next. No safe haven, that is basically your message to us. We can have no safe haven, and Afghanistan was the safe haven, and it is clearly not open to them, and we have got to just follow all of the safe havens, wherever the path may lead us.

And that takes me to—and I know you do not like to call this a training manual, or a manual, because it is a bunch of papers, but we have them all together here, and one of the pages talks about the following security precautions should be taken into account during training, and they list 13 things. They say, the place should have the following specifications.

Distance from the population areas with the availability of living necessities, availability of medical services during the training. The place should be suitable for the type of training, physical fitness, shooting and tactics. No one except the trainers and trainees should know about the place. The place should have many roads and entrances. The place should be visited at suitable times. Hiding any training traces immediately after the training, guarding the place during the training. Appropriateness of the existing facilities for the number of training members. Exclusion of anyone who is not connected with the training. Taking all security measures regarding the establishment. Distance of the place from police stations, public establishments, and the eyes of informants, and last, the place should not be situated in such a way that the training and trainees can be seen from another location.

Now, are these camps, as far as you know—where are these training camps? Do we have a sense that any could be in the United States?

Mr. WILSHERE. I think that they have looked at—not necessarily the bin Laden people, but other people related to jihadist training have looked at the possibility of setting up camps in the United States.

I think logistically and security speaking they found it perhaps more benign in Europe to do this, and kind of the very introductory training facilities perhaps, where they would have the broomsticks and what-not, could occur—for example, several of the people who

were involved on the attack side in the kidnapping in Yemen of some Western tourists, where some British citizens were killed, and I think an American citizen was also killed, several of those people were British citizens who had started their training in the U.K.

Senator BOXER. So we do not really know where these training camps are. We certainly know they were in Afghanistan.

Mr. WILSHERE. In Afghanistan there is a pretty good idea of where they are. Right now, they are going through them, but other than Afghanistan the military training and the more advanced training, they gravitated toward Afghanistan. There were also some in South Lebanon, probably, that they used, in the refugee camps, perhaps, but not large-scale.

Senator BOXER. Because it does not fit the criteria. It has to be far away from everyone who is not a member. I am assuming they stick to these—they do not compromise on these 13. One of them says it has to be completely isolated, and I just wondered, could we use our satellite capabilities and those kinds of capabilities to track these kinds of camps, now that we have this document and we know what they are doing, because that seems to me to be something worthwhile.

Mr. Caruso, can you comment on that, or can you not comment on that? I do not want to compromise anything.

Mr. CARUSO. Thank you. I would recommend that some other agencies talk to you about that in a private setting. I think you would get a very satisfying answer.

Senator BOXER. I do have one last question. One of my constituents, Mr. Sabero, was killed by Abu Sayyef rebels in the Philippines, and I wonder if you feel there are ties between Abu Sayyef and al-Qaeda, and is the FBI working with the Philippines to combat terrorism?

Mr. WILSHERE. Certainly, what was noticeable when Abu Sayyef group kidnapped the first lot of European tourists that did not include an American, that they looked like they tried to get some Americans and missed. Their demands were very focused on people who were in prison in the United States for Islamic terrorism, the blind sheik, Ramsi Yussef and that crowd. It is not something that would be typical of a very small, rural Filipino Muslim independence movement, so there was an outside influence there.

There is more than likely some consulting that goes on, and they have probably trained in Afghanistan, some of them, so it is a reasonable suspicion.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Caruso.

Mr. CARUSO. We are working with the Philippine authorities on the particular matter that you mentioned, and I would if I may just leave it at that, but we are engaged.

Senator BOXER. Well, I want to thank you for coming very, very much, and tell Mr. Chertoff he sent me two terrific people, and I am very grateful for that. Thank you.

Now we are going to ask our second panel to come forward, and you are welcome to stay and listen to the next panel, but if you have things to do like what I think you have to do, you had better go do it.

The second panel consists of Mr. Larry Johnson—he is the CEO of Berg Associates, an international consulting firm. Previously, Mr. Johnson was the Deputy Director of the State Department Office of Counterterrorism, and he also worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, and also Ms. Michele Flournoy, senior advisor for the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Flournoy has written a book called, “To Prevail, an American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism.”

We are very happy to have you here, and Mr. Johnson, why don’t you begin, and I think you know what I am trying to get for the record and for the American people is the sense of taking a moment’s time out from what is happening right now, and looking a little bit ahead, and where we go from here, so please go right ahead and edify us.

**STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY C. JOHNSON, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR (1989–1993) OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you for having me today, Senator Boxer, and I submitted my statement, and presumably it will be included in the record. I can tell you a first-hand story of an experience that I had in Panama in the Colon Free Zone to illustrate some of the issues that were brought up.

I agree with everything that the FBI colleagues expressed beforehand. The al-Qaeda network exists. They have sympathizers around the world, but they are not these Islamic supermen that can go anywhere, do anything, anytime that they want. They are human beings. They face the same kind of limitations that every other human being does, and as someone who has been involved with scripting counterterrorism exercises for the U.S. military forces that have that mission, I know what it takes to put those folks in motion and to get them from point A to point B, and it is not easy. It is not something you do at a snap of the fingers. They can do it fairly quickly, but you have an enormous amount of resources dedicated to that task. These terrorists fortunately do not have those kinds of resources. They do not have their own military airlift command. They do not have their own logistics support agency.

Twelve years ago, I was involved in Central America, doing an investigation into product counterfeiting that was taking place against a U.S. company, and one of the individuals that we discovered—he is not an al-Qaeda member, but he is involved with radical Palestinian groups that are involved with terrorism. The person we found selling the stuff was named Waleed Sayeed Mazees, and he was out in San Francisco at one point, I think you will be happy to know.

When we busted him for selling these counterfeit products, the local Panamians working with me said this guy is a terrorist, did you know that? I said, no. They said, and he also went to jail for money-laundering, and in this book that he wrote—it is in Spanish—Palestine, the “Burning Silence,” he details his secret entries into Palestine to meet with members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and some other groups.

The reason I raise him is, you find right now throughout Latin America, particularly in the Colon Free Zone of Panama, in a little town up in the Guajira Peninsula of Colombia called Maicao and down on the triborder area, in the Ciudad Del Este, which is on the border of Paraguay and Brazil, with Argentina close, there are networks of good Muslims and there are also networks of people affiliated with radical Islamic groups such as Hezbollah, some Hamas ties, and people with sympathies with al-Qaeda.

What makes these potentially of concern, and I can cite the case of Argentina in particular, you have radical groups that sympathize with the Muslims that also have some ties with neo-Nazi groups and that have ties with right-wing groups up here in the United States. Now, fortunately, none of those groups have been willing to carry out attacks against the United States, but these groups exist, they are there, they are operating, and when you look at the case of Argentina, I led a U.S. team when I was with the State Department to Buenos Aires in the aftermath of the bombing of the Israeli Embassy back in 1992, and to this day there is some suspicion that elements of Argentinian intelligence were involved, or at least were sympathetic in helping facilitate the activities of groups like Hezbollah.

In dealing with al-Qaeda—and this goes back to a question you raised earlier—I hesitate to draw the parallel, but I will, because the parallel is humorous and al-Qaeda is not, but they have taken on a bit of the persona of the Black Knight from Monty Python's "Holy Grail," while as you are lopping of limbs the individual continues to want to fight, to make the most outrageous threats.

We need to take their threats seriously, there is no doubt. As illustrated by the videotape of last week, bin Laden believes what he says. It may be delusional when he cites that they have had more people join Islam since the bombing on 9/11, or the murder on 9/11 than in the previous 11 years. I mean, that is delusional.

It is almost borderline psychotic, because it is not true, but I am sure he sincerely believes it. He tells his followers that, and he has enough sycophants around him that will nod their head, say yes, you are absolutely correct, and yet without him—he has not recognized the ability to see that in the streets of Islamabad, in the streets in Indonesia and Malaysia, in significant countries around the world with Muslim populations, millions were not going into the streets to say, we support bin Laden.

They were staying at home. They were voting with their feet by not getting out in the streets, and that is an important point, because in lopping off these arms of the al-Qaeda movement we are sending a very important message, and I think over the short term it is going to be very difficult for them to reconstitute.

But that brings me to a final point, and I will wrap up here and turn it over to Michele. State sponsorship is critical. There have been some in the past that have argued that bin Laden and al-Qaeda represent a new kind of terrorist that is independent of state sponsorship. That is total garbage. We are realizing that when we are looking at what is going on in Afghanistan.

Without those training camps and those places to feed people, house them, teach them how to shoot—no one is born knowing how to shoot or build a bomb, and particularly when you are talking

about building bombs, that is something that takes practice. If you go home with your own recipe book more often than not you are going to blow yourself up before you kill someone else. You have to practice these skills, and these are perishable skills.

As we take care of Afghanistan, the one target that I never really understood why we would not go after, at least in a concerted effort diplomatically first, is Lebanon. Apart from Afghanistan there is no other country in the world, not one, that has as many terrorist training camps, as many activist terrorist groups and terrorists that have killed, up to 9/11, more Americans than any other group in the world.

The folks who murdered U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem and CIA station chief Bill Buckley, and Marine Colonel Rich Higgins, and the 241 marines and former CIA colleague Mr. Ames as well as other members of the U.S. Embassy—I mean, the list goes on, and we have allowed Lebanon a pass, and that must come to an end, because what we learned—it took us a while to learn it during the cold war, is that these groups, without the sponsorship of a state, cannot function, and we have seen some pretty effective results.

Libya, as a case in point, has really substantially backed out of the terrorist sponsor game, in part because they got bombed, in part because we kept coming after them with international sanctions, and because the world community was finally willing to unite against them, and even Khadafi gave up. He forced Abu Ibrahim, a bomber from the battle days, out of his country.

We also saw in the case of Syria, when Turkey mobilized its forces on the northern border of Syria, threatening to invade because Syria was harboring a terrorist leader by the name of Abdullah Ocalan, Syria got rid of the guy, and the Turks ultimately captured him.

And I will stop there.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LARRY C. JOHNSON, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF  
COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee today to discuss the global threat posed by Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network and the steps the United States should take to neutralize this threat. I have worked on the issue of terrorism in several capacities during the last 22 years—as an academic at the American University, as an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency from 1985 to 1989, and as a policymaker in the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism. Since leaving the State Department October of 1993 I have provided consulting services on terrorism issues to the U.S. Government. My work has included an analysis of the U.S. Government's databases on chemical and biological agents and scripting terrorism exercises for the U.S. military.

As we press the attack against bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network, we must not lose sight of the fact that international terrorism cannot prosper without the support of one or more state sponsors. No one is born with the knowledge of how to build bombs, use a pistol, conduct surveillance, or hijack airplanes. These are skills that must be taught and practiced. Guns, bullets, and explosives do not grow on trees. They have to be purchased. If you are going to train people to conduct terrorist operations you have to have a place or places for the training. Ranges for shooting guns and detonating explosives are essential. The people being trained also need a place to sleep and something to eat. All of this requires money.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its proxies bank rolled a variety of Marxist-Leninist groups that attacked U.S. interests around the world. They also provided training and protection against retaliatory strikes. When the Soviet Union collapsed, many leftist terrorist groups also disappeared or curtailed their activities.

Without a source of funding and a safe place to live and train, many terrorist groups, such as the Japanese Red Army, the National Marxist Leninist Front (FMLN) of El Salvador, and the Red Army Faction, found it impossible to continue operating.

While Al-Qaeda differs in many respects from the groups that attacked the United States during the cold war era, it also has required the support of several states in order to carry out its operations. The biggest booster was Afghanistan, which provided bin Laden and his followers a place to live, plan, train, and organize. Also implicated, albeit indirectly, are Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Prominent citizens of these countries have provided money to bin Laden and facilitated the movement of Al-Qaeda personnel in and out of Afghanistan.

The threat posed by the Al-Qaeda network is particularly dangerous because they do not appear to be constrained by a desire to forge political coalitions or rally public opinion. Instead, they are embarked on a holy mission and are prepared to do anything to achieve that goal. According to the *Al-Qaeda Manual*, which was discovered by Manchester England's Metropolitan Police, bin Laden warns his disciples that:

The confrontation that we are calling for with the apostate regimes does not know Socratic debates . . . Platonic ideals . . . nor Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun. . . . Islamic governments have never and will never be established through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are established as they [always] have been by pen and gun, by word and bullet, by tongue and teeth

Al-Qaeda marks a distinctive departure from the attitude and actions of other radical Islamist movements. Even groups like Hamas and Hizbollah, who are guilty of heinous attacks against U.S. citizens, in recent years have shied away from direct attacks on the U.S., choosing instead to use the United States as a fund raising base.

The threat posed by bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network predates the attacks of 11 September 2001. In the eleven years preceding the attacks on 11 September 107 American's were murdered in international terrorist incidents (1990 thru 2000). Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network were implicated in 81 of these deaths. The death toll includes the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the bombing of the U.S. military housing complex in Dahrán, Saudi Arabia, the bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa in August of 1998, and the bombing of the USS *Cole* in Yemen in October of last year.

The targets hit by bin Laden during the past decade are consistent with the objectives identified in the *Al-Qaeda Manual*:

The main mission for which the Military Organization is responsible is the overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic regime. Other missions consist of the following:

1. Gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations, and the neighbors.
2. Kidnapping enemy personnel, documents, secrets, and arms.
3. Assassinating enemy personnel as well as foreign tourists.
4. Freeing the brothers who are captured by the enemy.
5. Spreading rumors and writing statements that instigate people against the enemy.
6. Blasting and destroying the places of amusement, immorality, and sin; not a vital target. (sic)
7. Blasting and destroying the embassies and attacking vital economic centers.
8. Blasting and destroying bridges leading into and out of the cities.

While acknowledging the international threat posed by Al-Qaeda, we should also admit they have not demonstrated the ability to strike at will. There is no doubting their desire to attack U.S. targets and kill U.S. citizens, but desire is not enough. They also need trained personnel, adequate financial resources, and a vulnerable target. The Al-Qaeda attack against the U.S. Embassy in Kenya in August 1998 demonstrated that no matter how committed the terrorist is their ability to achieve their objectives can be thwarted by security practices and technologies. The refusal of U.S. Embassy security guards to open a gate and provide the terrorists access to the parking garage prevented much greater loss of life by U.S. citizens.

Most of the terrorist attacks directed against the United States last year (and this year as well) were not carried out by Al-Qaeda. Colombia was the site of most anti-

U.S. attacks, accounting for 186 out of the 423 incidents recorded in the year 2000. These were directed against oil pipelines managed by U.S. and British companies. Fortunately, the Colombian terrorists generally shied away from causing international casualties and no U.S. oil workers in Colombia were killed or injured last year.

While not engaging in many attacks, Al-Qaeda terrorism caused all of the U.S. fatalities. Apart from the attacks in Colombia, there were seventeen other incidents that harmed U.S. citizens or interests:

- Eleven kidnappings involved one or more U.S. citizens. Seven of these involved U.S. companies—Haliburton, Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Noble, and Erickson Air-Crane.
- Five bombings killed or injured U.S. citizens or caused property damage. Terrorists tied to bin Laden bombed the USS *Cole* killing 17 and wounding 39. A bomb at a McDonalds in France killed one. The other explosions—outside the U.S. Embassy in the Philippines, at a Citibank in Greece, and in the offices of PT Newmont Mining in Indonesia—caused property damage and no loss of life.
- Vandals trashed a McDonalds restaurant in South Africa.

Groups linked to Al-Qaeda, which received training at bin Laden sponsored camps in Afghanistan, carried out significant attacks in India last year and are continuing their campaign of terror. Almost one of every five international terrorist attacks in 2000 occurred in India. India accounted for almost 50% of all deaths (187) and injuries (337) from terrorist attacks during 2000. The culprits included the Harakat-ul-Ansar and the Lashkar Tayyiba, which have been trained in Afghanistan and protected by Pakistan.

Terrorist attacks in India and in Washington, DC and New York were facilitated by groups that received tacit, if not full, support of at least one country. Regretfully, the U.S. record in identifying and punishing states that sponsor terrorism has been inconsistent. In the past we have placed some countries on the black list and applied economic and diplomatic sanctions. In other cases we have ignored evidence of sponsorship, Pakistan and Greece are two examples, because of bilateral policy concerns. I hope that our campaign in Afghanistan marks a watershed and sends a clear message to the rest of the world that the United States will no longer tolerate or excuse any nation that sponsors, directly or indirectly, terrorism.

In dealing with the immediate threat posed by Al-Qaeda we inevitably will require the support of countries like Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia where these terrorists have families and friends. Of these four countries only Sudan is currently listed by the U.S. Government as a terrorist sponsor. These countries must understand there is no middle ground in tracking down and detaining these terrorists. Preventing these individuals from reconstituting their capabilities and developing new terrorist schemes will require bilateral cooperation, clandestine intelligence operations, and targeted military special operations.

We also need to rethink and reenergize our policy for dealing with the other countries currently listed as state sponsors of terrorism—Iraq, Libya, Syria, Cuba, and North Korea—as key backers of Al-Qaeda. Of the five, Iran and Syria are the most active in providing support to groups that are more active than Al-Qaeda and almost as lethal. This includes groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These groups are backed by Syria and Iran and operate freely from Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

Lebanon, which is also not listed as a state sponsor of terrorism, came up on the radar with a remarkable piece of intelligence made public in October 2000. On October 20, the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, accepted a guilty plea from Ali A. Mohamed, an Egyptian-born former U.S. Army green beret sergeant, and one of six men indicted in the U.S. for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998. Mohamed not only confessed that he took part in a conspiracy to murder U.S. citizens in Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and East Africa, but he tied the assaults directly to Saudi exile Osama bin Laden. Mohamed's confession also linked bin Laden with another terrorist-at-large—a murky man whose American victims over the last two decades far outnumber bin Laden's—Hezbollah security chief, Imad Mughniyeh.

Prior to 11 September, Mughniyeh and Hezbollah had killed more Americans in international terrorist attacks than any other group. Two hundred sixty Americans and 116 foreigners died in the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, operations believed to have been carried out by Mughniyeh. He was also behind the 1985 hijacking of TWA 847 and the murder of U.S. Navy diver, Robert Stethem, a passenger on that flight. And Mughniyeh is believed to have masterminded the kidnapping of more than 50 hostages in Beirut, including CIA Chief William Buckley and U.S. Marine Colonel Rich Higgins, both



tortured and murdered while in captivity. Mughniyeh has not limited his terror to American targets. He has been implicated in the bombings of the Israeli installations in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, and more recently, in a terrorist rocket attack against the Russian Embassy in Beirut.

The importance of Ali Mohamed's confession is not just that it represents the first credible, public evidence that Mughniyeh and bin Laden have been collaborating, but that Iran has been backing them. Mohamed gave sworn testimony that between 1991 and 1993, he handled security arrangements for a meeting between Mughniyeh and bin Laden where they established their common goal of forcing the U.S. to withdraw from the Middle East. According to Mohamed's testimony, bin Laden was inspired to replicate Mughniyeh's success in compelling the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon in 1984, following the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the Marines barracks in Beirut. Mohamed's testimony also adds authority to a media report that Iran's Ministry of Information and Security convoked a terrorist conclave in Tehran in 1996 that included Mughniyeh and a senior aide to bin Laden.

Mughniyeh and bin Laden are the two most prolific mass murderers currently at large. Their networks extend beyond the Middle East and include contacts and supporters in places like the Philippines and Paraguay/Brazil/Argentine border in South America. Our policies to deal with these threats must be tailored to the local conditions. In the Philippines three groups—Abu Sayyef, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Moro National Liberation Front—are active in remote areas in the south and have attacked and killed Americans. The Philippine military and police would definitely benefit from direct support by U.S. military Special Forces.

The tri-border area of South America, in the city Ciudad del Este, offers a different challenge. Unlike the terrorist camps in Afghanistan, this area is a commercial center characterized by drug smuggling, contraband cigarettes and liquor, counterfeit merchandise, and stolen vehicles. It is the wild west of organized criminal activity. But this area reportedly also was used by Imad Mughniyeh to plot bombings in Buenos Aires of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the Jewish Cultural Center (1994). Shutting down operations in this area require a close integration of law enforcement and intelligence operations.

A key to preventing and deterring future terrorist attacks is to ensure that the world enforces a zero tolerance policy when it comes to sponsoring terrorism. While we may never be able to eliminate or neutralize every terrorist cell willing to murder innocent civilians, we know from experience that these cells cannot thrive without the support of a state. From the horror and ruin of September 11 we have an opportunity to start afresh with a more sharply defined set of terrorism goals—we have made a good start going after bin Laden and his protectors—and bring the full, coordinated force of American diplomatic, military, and intelligence capabilities to bear on the problem.

Senator BOXER. Thank you. You gave us some very good information. We appreciate it.

Michele Flournoy, welcome. Thank you very much.

**STATEMENT OF MS. MICHELE FLOURNOY, SENIOR ADVISOR,  
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Ms. FLOURNOY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. I have submitted the findings and recommendations of our book,<sup>1</sup> "To Prevail," as my formal prepared statement, but if I could I would just like to take a few minutes to address the question you raised about next steps.

I think to answer the question about next steps, we have to go back to our primary objectives in this war, in this long-term campaign, and I would argue that there are four. Obviously, the first is to try to defeat and destroy terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda with global reach who are aiming to attack us. Second is to diminish and end state sponsorship of such groups where it occurs. Third

<sup>1</sup>The book can be purchased on-line by visiting the Center for Strategic and International Studies' website: [www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org)

is to enhance our homeland security, and fourth, I would argue, is to try to address some of the conditions that create fertile soil for such terrorism to take root and grow. This is really a part of the debate where we have not had extensive discussions yet, and it is a part of the discussion where I feel this committee has particular strength to move into.

When I talk about the conditions, I want to be clear that we are quite categorical in the work we did at CSIS in saying there is nothing that justifies or excuses what happened on 9/11, but you can identify conditions that allowed the terrorists to get recruits, allowed them to get money, and allowed them to get sympathy in certain quarters of the world, and those are conditions that our foreign policy needs to address over the very long term.

So, next steps. In my mind, the No. 1 priority is to continue the campaign against al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is anything but a hierarchy. It is a truly global network. It is akin to a multiheaded hydra. While we are succeeding in chopping off one head in Afghanistan, it does not keep the rest of the organism from functioning. So I think first and foremost is continuing intelligence cooperation, law enforcement cooperation, financial cooperation to track and choke off money supplies to close down cells or severely hamper the operations of cells in Europe, in the United States perhaps, still, in the Middle East, in Asia. That has to remain our first priority in this campaign as we go forward.

Second, I think we need to turn our attention to other states who have provided some sort of support, direct or indirect, to groups like al-Qaeda, and to pressure them—in each case I think it will require a different mix of instruments, but I think that is a second key set of steps.

And third is to go back to this issue of addressing the underlying conditions, and here I am really talking about four key areas. The first is, I think we have to address the question of failed states, not just from a humanitarian impulse, now, but from a strategic perspective. If we allow failed states to fester unaddressed for long periods of time, many of them will become, some of them have become sanctuaries that terrorists use to operate, they use to recruit, train, et cetera. I think we have to address that issue more strategically as part of our foreign policy.

Obviously, the first test case is going to be what we do with Afghanistan once the fighting stops. If we do not take post conflict reconstruction seriously in Afghanistan, I would argue that we will risk being back there within a decade doing the same thing over again. We have to care, not about building the perfect democracy in Afghanistan—that is not a realistic goal—but about restoring a measure of a functioning state and stability in that country.

I think we also need to look at other failed states and ask the same question, if they are, in fact, providing sanctuary for terrorists.

A second element is, I think we need to reexamine our Middle East strategy, and here I want to build on what was said in the first panel, that the United States is an object of deep resentment in some populations like in Saudi Arabia, like in Egypt, because we are perceived as supporting governments who are not as responsive as they should be to the needs of their populations.

I think the United States needs to use its very close relationships with those governments to pressure them to modernize, to create more real economic opportunities for their populations, to create real opportunities for political participation in those societies. Again I am not talking about supporting American-style democracies, but I am talking about modernization in a way that creates outlets for a whole generation of people who have no other alternative but to turn to extremism and violence.

The second thing I think is untenable is that these close allies of ours have, in the past, turned somewhat of a blind eye to activities and financing of extreme groups on their soil as long as the violence was directed outside their borders. That is no longer a tenable position for those countries to take, and I think again we need to leverage our relationship to try to work toward changing some of the conditions that are fueling discontent that creates the conditions where a group like al-Qaeda can gain recruits and so forth.

A third element is our foreign assistance, a very, very powerful instrument that I would argue we are not using as well as we could to support our foreign policy objectives. As you all know, our foreign assistance goes primarily to two countries. There are more than 100 earmarks on the foreign assistance. Eighty cents on the dollar actually goes through U.S. companies.

There are lots of problems with that budget, and I would argue if we are going to get serious about economic and political development that changes the conditions, that really does drain the swamp that terrorism thrives in, we need to use our foreign assistance much more strategically. I will give you one example, educational reform. Right now, a whole generation of young boys in certain Middle Eastern states are going through these madrasses and being indoctrinated into jihad because they have no other way to feed themselves, they have no other way to clothe themselves, they have no other way to get an education, if that can be called an education. Investing some money in helping to build a real educational system and real economic opportunities for that generation would be one that would pay off, I think, in the long term.

Senator NELSON. Madam Chairman, might I ask what particular countries are you thinking of? Pakistan is certainly one.

Ms. FLOURNOY. I am thinking primarily of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, but you could certainly add others to the list. Those are the big three, in my view.

Senator NELSON. And how could you, with the incentive of foreign assistance, get—take, for example, Pakistan, to suddenly clamp down on these religious schools where these children are getting this kind of extremist education?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think one of the questions we have to ask is whether we want to funnel all of our foreign assistance through governments, or whether we want to invest more directly in civil societies and through nongovernmental organizations, through other groups that will buildup educational structures and so forth.

It is not clear in every case that funneling the money through the government is the right answer. I think obviously we need to look at it on a case-by-case basis, but I think in some cases giving the government more money will not be the right answer, but you

may want to look at alternatives, particularly in the area of education, in my view.

Senator NELSON. That was Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and what?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Egypt. Those are the main three I would highlight, although there would be others.

If I may, the fourth and final area that I would encourage you to look at is the whole question of public diplomacy. I believe that over the last decade or more the mechanisms that allow us to get our message out in key parts of the world, particularly the Middle East, have atrophied severely, so that even when we are doing the right thing, even when U.S. troops are saving Muslims lives in Bosnia, when the United States is the No. 1 food donor to Afghanistan before the war, and you can go on with this list of facts that no one can dispute, the message does not get out. I think part of that is that we really do not have the kinds of mechanisms that we had in the cold war to get that message out, and so I would urge you to take a look at that as well.

Thank you.

Senator BOXER. Well, there are many questions. I would say, Ms. Flournoy, that I followed everything you said. I would just take exception with one thing, and I want to get into a little discussion before I turn to Mr. Johnson.

You say that if we were to change our Middle East policy, and you use the word, help countries like Saudi Arabia modernize is what was said, that that would help. I honestly do not think so. I mean, I think we should do that, do not get me wrong, because Saudi Arabia needs to modernize, but the last thing al-Qaeda wants, and the fundamentalists want, is to see Saudi Arabia modernized. They want them to become more religious and more fundamentalist, and so I do not think we should delude ourselves. I mean, these countries are certainly not perfect, and we went in to help Kuwait and did the right thing, but the bottom line is, though, they do not have a perfect government either, and I do not think if we suddenly changed their government, then you would find al-Qaeda going away. I think it is a little—I just do not think it is real. I wonder if you could respond.

In other words, if tomorrow we just said the United States is changing its foreign policies, we are going to help Saudi Arabia modernize—what were the other countries?—Egypt to modernize, and—

Ms. FLOURNOY. Pakistan.

Senator BOXER. And Pakistan modernize, that suddenly al-Qaeda would go away. I think it would be in a way worse for us, because I think they would say, why are you interfering, we do not want them modernized, so I am a little confused. Maybe the word modernize is the wrong word, or we are not communicating.

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think maybe modernize is not as specific as I need to be. In the case of Saudi Arabia, I think the issue is not so much economic development, because I think the average citizen enjoys quite a good standard of living, comparatively speaking. The issue is political participation. People feel they have no voice, and they feel they are living under a government that does not represent their interests, and so in Saudi Arabia the issue is political.

If you do not want to call it modernization, political participation, creating avenues for participation to give people—

Senator BOXER. You mean a democracy?

Ms. FLOURNOY. More democratic, whether it is—it does not have to be democracy as in our system, but something that is moving in that direction, to allow people forms of political participation that are real.

In the case of Egypt, then you add on the economic dimension. There is real poverty for the majority of the population in Egypt, and there we are talking about not only political participation but also real economic development to create opportunities.

Part of this is the demographics. You have countries where their populations are becoming more than 50, 60 percent under the age of 25. Very few people have prospects, any hope of employment in their lifetimes, very little opportunity to participate economically or politically. They are very frustrated, so they turn to groups that offer them some sense of meaning and cause. I think we need to create alternatives. I think one of the best measures of success long-term could be a whole generation of young men turning away from groups like al-Qaeda to participate economically and politically in their societies and in making them better.

Senator BOXER. Mr. Johnson, I wanted to ask you if you agreed with that part of Ms. Flournoy's presentation. I agreed with everything else but that point. I just do not see it.

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not represent myself as an Arab expert, but a very good friend of mine is one of the preeminent ones in the world, and in one of those private conversations we had a few weeks back with a couple of other folks he said, look, the reality is if we had democracy in some of these Middle Eastern countries we would not like the results, because where a lot of the mass population is politically would be against the very things we are trying to prevent.

And the problem with these societies, there is some genuine discontent in there, but the discontent that exists is not the result of U.S. actions and policies, and maybe we can be accused of being a facilitator for some of these governments where they have continued to persist in their policies, but they themselves are not always in touch with reality.

I appeared a couple of weeks ago with Adel al Jubeir, who is the right-hand man to Crown Prince Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, and I had what we used to call in diplomatic parlance a frank exchange of views, saying look, the Saudi Arabians need to understand that U.S. citizens have now reached a level that we are not tolerant of you playing both sides of the fence. You cannot tell us you are our friend and then send money to these murderers, and then you guys run off and go whoring in London and then come back and try to be the defenders of Islam.

I said, that does not wash any more, because we have got 3,000 dead Americans. My people, who most of whom came from Saudi Arabia, and instead of you being friends, instead of you stepping up and saying, let us find every way we can to cooperate, you acted like defense attorneys. You cooperated in the fullest sense of the law term, but we had to drag it out of you piece by piece. You were not being proactive as friends.

And he said to me, he said, well, why doesn't anyone else in this administration—and he says, you are not the administration, but why isn't the government saying this to me? I was over meeting with Secretary Armitage. He did not tell me that. And I said, well, they should, and part of the problem is because they are not hearing that kind of message from the administration, it is not just this administration, it has been every administration, and consistently from the Senate and the House, they run away with this impression that this is just a temporary tempest in a teapot that is going to blow over, and they get away with it.

Senator BOXER. Very interesting.

Ms. Flournoy, do you agree with Mr. Johnson that Lebanon is a place we need to look in terms of state-sponsored terrorism, because you said that was the second thing we had to stop, was state-sponsored terrorism. Do you agree with his assessment that Lebanon is one of the worst offenders here?

Ms. FLOURNOY. Not related to al-Qaeda, but related to other groups, yes. If we are going to broaden our scope beyond al-Qaeda to look at other groups that have the potential to damage our interests, I think Lebanon is certainly on the list.

Senator BOXER. What other states do you see on the list?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would say Yemen, I would say the Philippines, I would say parts of the Caucasus, and I would say Somalia, and each one is unique, and each one is going to take a different strategy, a different set of tactics.

Senator BOXER. Do you agree with that list?

Mr. JOHNSON. Not as sponsors. Right now where the terrorist activity is underway, I do not see Yemen as much of a concern, because President Saleh, he told a group of Americans last year in private conversation, he said look, I do not like you guys, but you are winning and I am going with the winner. He was very up-front about it.

Senator BOXER. It is the big horse theory.

Mr. JOHNSON. Absolutely. I think when you are looking at where the terrorist activity is, Pakistan is a problem. In the year 2000 almost 50 percent of everyone who died and was injured in an international terrorist attack died in India. Those were the groups that were operating from Pakistan that we have been blowing up in Afghanistan.

Now, Pakistan has been one of these odd fellows. I mean, they have been a very good friend with us in helping us apprehend Ramsi Yusef, the first World Trade Center bomber, Mir Amal Kansi, the fellow who shot up the CIA employees in February 1993, and yet on the other hand, the ISI, the intelligence service of Pakistan, aggressively funding and helping the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and these groups like the—

Senator BOXER. Not any more, right? Didn't the head of that ISI—

Mr. JOHNSON. The head was replaced, I believe. I cannot show you documents or evidence, but there are elements of ISI that continue to lend that support. Now, it is not the official government policy, and I recognize the difficult position that President Musharraf is in, but the reality—and again, this is something that has to be conveyed to the Pakistanis very clearly.

We have got to get away from this notion that people can play with double standards, that they can give us the lip service and continue to slip the dollars under the table to these folks, because when you step back and look at it, Lebanon does not do what Lebanon does without the help of Syria and Iran. Now, I am glad that Iran says they want to be part of this global campaign. Great. Step to the plate, shut down the camps, and give us Imad Mugniyeh for starters.

The group that is operating in the Philippines, that is one that is a little more containable, and Michele is correct that the Philippines, particularly in the southern rim, with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyef, they were taking money from some of these Muslim charities. That was the case, and in fact I do recall when Ramsi Yusef, who blew up the World Trade Center the first go-around, was implicated in that, when he escaped from the Philippines he had two cohorts that were identified and taken into custody. One of those fellows escaped.

I am told by my former boss at the State Department, and I have no reason to doubt him, No. 1, because he was a marine, and marines do not lie, they had on videotape at one of the Filipino hotels a Saudi Arabian diplomat passing an envelope to one of those individuals. Now, how the whole money lash-up works between these charities, between these official governments—but that has been going on for several years, and that has got to stop, because when you dry up the money and you dry up the support, the reality of—last year, most of the terrorist incidents, they took place in Colombia, and India. Those two accounted for over 60 percent, and then when you factor in the Philippines, I do not want to say that terrorism disappears. There is always going to be a problem there, but this threat we face from people willing to kill Americans, I think that will disappear.

Senator BOXER. I just notice, neither of you mentioned Iraq. Would you care to give us your view on that?

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I could just clarify, my previous answer was really focused, actually, on countries that have groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, not necessarily state sponsors. I am sorry, I was answering a different question.

On Iraq, I have not seen evidence that has directly tied Iraq to the activities of al-Qaeda on 9/11. That said, I think that we know, we certainly know Iraq is a rogue state. We know that it has engaged in a range of illegal activities. We know that Saddam tried to assassinate a former U.S. President. I think regime change in Iraq should definitely be a U.S. foreign policy objective, no question in my view. It is a question of timing and sequencing.

If we were to go after Iraq as a next step, an immediate next step, I fear that we would lose many of the key members of the coalition that are critical to our success against al-Qaeda as we move forward in intelligence, law enforcement, financial cooperation. So I think we have to make a choice in sequence here. I personally would finish the job against al-Qaeda before turning the focus on Iraq, unless we gain some new evidence that links Saddam Hussein, for example, to supplying some weapons of mass destruction or something like that to al-Qaeda.

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree. Let me just add a couple of tidbits. I am not a believer in conspiracy theories, and having worked both in the Bush administration and the start of the Clinton administration I find it hard to believe that the CIA and the FBI have somehow conspired to keep intelligence about Iraqi involvement in terrorism out of "Patterns of Global Terrorism," which is published every year.

Here is what we know for a fact. Iraq sponsors the Mujahedin el Kalhq, who attack Iranians. They have sponsored the PKK, which was attacking the Kurdish Workers Party, which was attacking Turkish targets, and they have gone after Iraqi dissidents. The only recorded attempt we have since 1993, April 1993, was the attack in April to go after Bush for one, and they failed.

What I have seen in looking at Iraq's intelligence capabilities, they have tended to be sort of the Wile E. Coyote of terrorism. They more often than not pull the anvil down on their own head. They launched forty hit teams during the gulf war. Every one of them was wrapped up. Two of the guys blew themselves up in Manila. They were not terribly artful. They continued that pattern in the case of the attempt to kill former President Bush, thank God, that they failed.

So, could they be involved, yes. Do they have to be, are they one of the top sponsors right now? I think people that are saying that, they are making up facts, because the facts are not there to justify it, but as Michele correctly noted, we do need to deal with them because they are not living up to their agreement that they signed in 1991 not to go after weapons of mass destruction.

Senator BOXER. Exactly, and that is a huge issue, because we cannot get in there.

Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. If you were to state—this is a question for both of you—to one of the leaders of these nations like the King in Saudi Arabia, or the President in Egypt or Pakistan, how you would like them to stop their duplicity, how would you put it? Ms. Flournoy.

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would say, and I am not a diplomat, and that may show, a couple of things. One is, I would say, we know you have a problem of extremists on your soil. In the past, you have managed that problem by tolerating a certain degree of activity as long as it was directed outward. That is no longer acceptable to us, because we have lost too many lives as a result of that posture, so that needs to change.

The second thing I would say is, when we look at the demographics of your region, we are quite alarmed, and we think that if you do not create more political opportunities for participation, real economic development for your population, you will go the way of Iran.

When people say democracy does not work, modernization does not work, my question back is, what is the alternative, and I think the alternative is to watch the region go the way of Iran over the next decade or two. That is my fear.

So I think the demographics give us no choice but to try to find some means of giving these populations voice and opportunity, so they choose a nonviolent course.

Senator NELSON. Mr. Johnson.



Mr. JOHNSON. I would not put Egypt in the same category as Saudi Arabia in terms of not being cooperative. They have actually—they have been very aggressive in going after their elements, and you will find that the key elements in al-Qaeda from Zawahiri Atef, they have been sort of the brains for bin Laden's vision, and this Muslim brotherhood issue is something that goes back in the 1980's.

I think, though, with the Egyptians is, it is a different tack of saying, you have got to start doing something about addressing the lack of economic development in your country. You cannot continue to be a breeding ground for some of these folks. With the Saudis, though, I think we are going to have to be even more direct and say, we are not going to continue doing business as usual. You are not going to continue getting visas just because you are Saudis, we trust that you have enough money and that you are not going to come to the states and stay. Until you start showing us with concrete actions across the board that you are not going to tolerate this—I give you another case in point.

When Khobar Towers was blown up in 1996, the Central Intelligence Agency was not allowed to collect information on Saudi Hezbollah because we did not want to offend the Saudis. Now, I realize sometimes I am a little harsh and I may say things in an awkward manner and tick people off, but look, if we are going to make our concern in Saudi Arabia whether or not we keep them happy, we have got the wrong focus. We need to be willing to make them unhappy, because the people who blew up Khobar Towers, it was Saudi Hezbollah, and because we were not looking at them, we could not see it coming.

Senator NELSON. How would you say it to President Musharraf, given the fact that Musharraf has gone a great part of the distance already in helping us out?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think there I would start by actually acknowledging that he has exhibited a fair degree of courage in how he has responded to our request for assistance. And that has been wonderful in the short term. But in the long term, we need to look at the underlying conditions, at what is fueling this, at economic situation in your country. The fact is that, for many people, these fundamentalist religious institutions that indoctrinate jihad are the only opportunities they have for some sort of education. You need to help change that. You need to be a participant in actively changing the conditions that continue to fuel this fire.

Mr. JOHNSON. There is a need to, I think, start being very creative about the international focus, and whether it is U.S. troops on the border in Kashmir, because I do not sleep comfortably at night with India and Pakistan both nuclear armed, engaged with this proxy war of terrorism up in the Kashmir, and I realize Musharraf has got some significant problems to contend with domestically in trying to keep the fundamentalists and extremists tamped down, and trying to cooperate with us, and I think we are going to have to broaden this to beyond just the bilateral U.S.-Pakistani issue, that they are going to get some solid assurances that neither Pakistan nor India are going to find themselves feeling at risk.

Senator NELSON. Finally, Madam Chairman, you had suggested, Ms. Flournoy, that you would use NGO's instead of the government in order to encourage this changed kind of behavior. Can you amplify on that?

Ms. FLOURNOY. I am thinking of the kind of work that a USAID sometimes does in its longer term development assistance work, where we essentially contract out with either United States or sometimes international NGO's to actually do the work. If you are trying to fundamentally change a civil society and an educational system, you cannot just go from the top down. You have got to work from the bottom up. I am not a development economist, but I am sure there are models out there of programs that have been more effective in actually reaching local populations and addressing the whole question of civil society, but again I am not an expert in that area.

Senator NELSON. Thank you.

Senator BOXER. Let me just bring this back to kind of what is happening on the ground, Mr. Johnson. What effect would the capture or death of Osama bin Laden or Al Zawahiri have on the ability of al-Qaeda to operate, knowing what you know about them? Are there others who would step up? I mean, the FBI seem to think—well, I did not get too direct an answer on the point from them to tell you the truth.

Mr. JOHNSON. These guys are not in the situation like the New England Patriots, where you have Tom Brady at quarterback and a great backup on the bench.

Senator BOXER. I knew someone would use a football analogy sooner or later. That is OK.

Mr. JOHNSON. But they are really not deep. They are not deep in the leadership, and taking them out would be like taking out Adolf Hitler and Goebbels and Hermann Goering during World War II. Is it a blow that they could recover from potentially, and that assumes that we back off, allow these countries to go on, allow them to reconstitute.

As long as they cannot reconstitute and we can keep that pressure on, I do not think they are in a position to just suddenly magically grow intelligence, because even looking, with all of the skills and resources and commitment that al-Qaeda and bin Laden have had, and with the support of Zawahiri, on average they were only able to carry off a terrorist spectacular event about once every 12 months. Sometimes it took 24 months. They were in about a 12-month cycle, and I think we need to recognize that, because I am not suggesting they do not represent a threat, but also they are not in a position like a U.S. military force who can go and carry out an attack every day, every week, every month.

Senator BOXER. And particularly, do you think because they are under such enormous pressure?

Mr. JOHNSON. Look, you have got to have a place to sleep. I do not know if you had the chance—there was a wonderful image on CNN this morning of one of the al-Qaeda fighters who had a veil half over his face and the guy was sobbing about what the bombing did to him. I do not care how tough you think you are, if you are getting 5,000-pound bombs dropped on your head and you are not getting to sleep for a week you do not do well psychologically.

There is no human being in the world that can be sleep-deprived for a week or two and function well without going psychotic, and that is what these people are up against right now. Cut out their money as well, cut out their ability to travel, and without that, then you do disrupt the organization, and I think over the short term we make it much more difficult for them to carry out.

What I worry about is the long term, because our human nature is, we then go, well, we got that licked, and then we ignore it and it comes back.

Senator BOXER. Before, Michele, you add your point, I wanted to ask you about this reward, the large monetary reward. Do you think that—are those rewards a good strategy in capturing terrorists, do you think?

Mr. JOHNSON. As one of the individuals that helped put together the first terrorism rewards advertising campaign back in 1989 and 1990, when we used Charlton Heston, Charles Bronson, and Charlie Sheen in the Heroes Campaign, that was only \$2 million.

Senator BOXER. You had to be Charlie to get into it?

Mr. JOHNSON. It was a Charlie Campaign, but my partner on that, Brad Smith, who died 2 years ago of Lou Gehrig's disease, Brad was—he was running the rewards program from his wheelchair, and he was paralyzed from the neck down, working from his house down in Fredericksburg, Virginia, but it was Brad's creativity in coming up with a matchbook cover—in fact, the real story behind that was, he knew he was dying of Lou Gehrig's disease, and he went to his boss, Tony Quenton, who was the head of Diplomatic Security, and said, I have got this idea, and Mr. Quenton said, that is a terrible idea, do not do it.

So Brad went ahead and did it because he figured, I am dying, what can they do to me, and then he was smart enough, he sent copies up here to the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, and all the Members said, this is a great idea, and they called the State Department and said, this is a wonderful idea. Mr. Quenton said yes, I know, I thought of it.

Now, it was Brad that thought of it, and that matchbook cover was important in bringing in information that led to the arrest of Ramsi Ussef the first go-around in January 1995 in Pakistan.

Senator BOXER. So you think there are people running around looking for bin Laden, looking under the veils of the 6 foot 5 inch individuals?

Mr. JOHNSON. The family of Miramal Kanshi, who assassinated CIA employees outside the entrance to the CIA headquarters, his own family gave him up for \$2 million, so for \$25 million, there are folks over there who do understand the value of a dollar.

Ms. FLOURNOY. I was just going to add one counterpoint on the question of the mid to long term. My concern is that members of al-Qaeda and other affiliated groups have demonstrated what I think is pretty extraordinary patience, and the ability to go to ground and to be sleepers for a very long time. If you look at someone like Atta, the years of planning and preparation this took, and the degree to which he waited, my concern is that people will go to ground for the next couple of years and we will think it is over, and once the guard is let down, I worry about whether we can sustain our national resolve.

Can we sustain our national vigilance? Can we keep on this when there is not a demonstrated threat of attack? If we think it is, "over," we will let our guard down and they will be back. That is my concern. Yes, you hurt them when they cannot recruit and train openly, et cetera, but there is enough of them now that if they go to ground and wait us out—

Senator BOXER. I am really glad you said that, because that is one of the purposes of this hearing also. This is very different than a lot of challenges we face, because it is so long term, as in forever. Look, all you have to do is read Larry's testimony where he quotes from what we are calling the manual, the main mission—this is the words of al-Qaeda. The main mission for which the military organization is responsible is the overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic regime. That is the main mission.

Now, there are a lot of countries that are not going to become Islamic regimes because they tell us we have to do that. There is a lot of countries. So that is a very deep hole for certain people. That is why I have a little pull with you, Michele, just because I know your point is that you are saying well, if people are fed and they have opportunity, they will not go, but a lot of these people that go there are not poor people.

Look at Osama bin Laden himself. Look at some of the people in the top echelons. You are right in terms of lower down, but the top operatives are not going to be dissuaded because they could get a job, that is my own opinion, because it is a deeper motivation that reaches to their soul, and therefore we have to reach to our soul to say, this is not what we are about. We are about diversity. We respect Islam and we respect everything else, and that is what our country is, and so therefore we remain a target for these people who are on this terror, and so I think your pointing this out is really, really important.

I was asked today on some TV program did I think the American people had the wherewithal to stick with it, and I believe that we do, because I believe what they did in this attack on us touched so deep into our minds and our hearts and our lives that we will never, ever, ever forget it. Whether we were 8 years old and we saw it on TV and we asked our mother to explain it, or dad, or we were 85, we will never forget it. We know where we were when we saw it. We know it was one of those seminal moments in American history that we will not forget, and therefore I do not feel we will let down our guard.

But I think hearings like this really help, because we need people like you to level with us, and what I liked about hearing from all of you is that Larry makes a good point, this is very serious, but do not be in despair, because they are not everything that they want us to believe they are. It is an important point, Michele's point that we need multifaceted response to all of this, and the FBI just on the ground saying they are not going to stop until probably—they will never stop.

So this has been extremely helpful. Bill, do you have any more to add, or would you like to make a closing statement?

Senator NELSON. No. I just wanted to reconfirm, I spent 2 hours Sunday with the widower of a beautiful friend who was on Amer-

ican Flight 11, sitting up there in first class, close to seat 2D where Mohammed Atta was sitting, and I will tell you, when you hear that widower just pour his heart out for 2 hours, it is something that just so sears you, not even to speak of the experience you and I had on the morning of September 11 on the west side of the Capitol as we looked out the window when somebody burst in and said the Pentagon has been hit, and what we saw, not even to speak of what my wife saw in the apartment that we had just moved into 3 days before, overlooking the southwest corner of the Pentagon.

While she was getting dressed she heard the plane. She said, it sounded so low, like it was going to hit the apartment. She heard the explosion. She ran to the window and saw the whole thing. So what she saw, what you and I experienced, and tragically what my friend from Boston and Miami experienced is seared in the minds of good people all over Planet Earth, and they will not forget it.

Senator BOXER. Eighty people they killed, 300 Muslims they killed in the World Trade Center. Every plane was headed for California.

So therefore, Michele, I think that we will stick to this, and I just want to thank both of you very much for excellent testimony and all the panelists, and we stand adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

